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Whatever meaning this clause may have, none can be admitted, that
would give an unlimited discretion to Congress.-James Madison
INTRODUCTION
In two articles, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause and
New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,3 1 presented
evidence of the public meaning of Congress's power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."4 "Commerce" meant the trade or exchange
of goods (including the means of transporting them); "among the
several States" meant between persons of one state and another; and
the term "[t] o regulate" meant "to make regular"-to specify how an
activity may be transacted-when applied to domestic commerce, but
also included the power to make "prohibitory regulations" when ap-
plied to foreign trade.5 In sum, Congress has power to specify rules
to govern the manner by which people may exchange or trade goods
from one state to another, to remove obstructions to domestic trade
erected by states, and to both regulate and restrict the flow of goods
to and from other nations (and the Indian tribes) for the purpose of
promoting the domestic economy and foreign trade.
Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law (rbarnett@bu.edu). My
thanks to Kate McFarland for her research assistance. Permission to photocopy for classroom
use is hereby granted.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (Ed. Note: The Annals of the 1st Con-
gress are particularly problematic in citing due to differing hard-to-find versions that often do
not clearly delineate volume numbers. All citations to 1 ANNALS OF CONG. herein are to the
Annals of the 1st Congress, 1789-1791, as edited by Joseph Gales and available on the Library of
Congress's Web site at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwaclink.hinl).
2 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101
(2001) [hereinafter Barnett, Original Meaning].
Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 847 (2003) [hereinafter Barnett, New Evidence].
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5 Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 101.
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To determine the constitutionality of any particular legislation
and evaluate judicial applications of the Commerce Clause, we must
also consider the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.6 For,
as has been noted by Stephen Gardbaum, the expansive post-New
Deal reading of congressional power owes as much to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause as it does
to the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the Commerce Clause:
[T] he New Deal Court's own constitutional justification for its radical
expansion of the scope of federal power over commerce was that the
congressional measures in question were valid exercises of the power
granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause and were not direct exer-
cises of the power to regulate commerce among the several states. That
is, the Court did not simply and directly enlarge the scope of the Com-
merce Clause itself, as is often believed. Rather, it upheld various federal
enactments as necessary and proper means to achieve the legitimate ob-
7jective of regulating interstate commerce.
In this Article, I present the evidence of the original public mean-
ing of the Necessary and Proper Clause." These findings will, of
course, be of interest to originalists. But, they should also be of in-
terest to the many constitutional scholars who consider original
meanin to be one among several legitimate modes of constitutional
analysis, or who consider original meaning the starting point of a
process by which this meaning is translated into contemporary
terms. ' By either account, it is important to find the correct original
meaning, even if it is not dispositive of today's cases and controver-
sies.
I will show that the choice between the meanings of "necessary"
inherited from John Marshall's discussion in McCullUoch v. Maly-
land' -that of "indispensably requisite" on the one hand and merely
"convenient" on the other-is undercut by the available evidence.
Rather, the truth lies somewhere in between.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 795, 807-08
(1996) (footnotes omitted).
I distinguish between an originalism based on "original meaning" and an originalism
based on "original intent." See Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 105-08. For my initial
explication and defense of original meaning originalism, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REv. 611 (1999). I will be expanding my defense of originalism as
a vital means of enhancing constitutional legitimacy in RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (forthcoming February 2004).
See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13-14 (1991) (counting both
"historical" and "textual" as useful and legitimate "modalities" of constitutional argument).
1o See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (proposing a
method of interpretation that translates original meaning into present day circumstances).
11 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 367 (1819).
12 This Article represents a change in my position from that which I expressed in Randy E.
Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REv. 745 (1997), an article written before I had
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I. THE ORIGIN OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
The Necessary and Proper Clause was added to the Constitution
by the Committee on Detail without any previous discussion by the
Constitutional Convention. Nor was it the subject of any debate from
its initial proposal to the Convention's final adoption of the Constitu-
tion.13 One thing we do know about its legislative history is the word-
ing of a clause that was earlier proposed by Gunning Bedford and re-
jected by the Committee. The proposal was that Congress have the
power "to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union,
and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or
in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individual Legislation.0 4 In other words, the Convention
had before it an almost completely open-ended grant of power to
Congress and rejected it, without discussion, in favor of the enumera-
tion of particular powers and the ancillary Necessary and Proper
Clause.
The likely reason why the Necessary and Proper Clause received
no attention by the Convention became clear during the debates in
the ratification conventions, as did its public meaning. There, oppo-
nents of the Constitution pointed to this power as evidence that the
national government had unlimited and undefined powers. In the
New York Convention, for example, John Williams contended that it
"is perhaps utterly impossible fully to define this power."" For this
reason, "[w] hatever they judge necessary for the proper administra-
tion of the powers lodged in them, they may execute without any
check or impediment."'
Meanwhile, Federalist supporters of the Constitution repeatedly
denied the charge that Congress had discretion in defining the scope
of its own powers. They insisted that the Necessary and Proper
Clause was not an additional freestanding grant of power, but merely
made explicit what was already implicit in the grant of each enumer-
ated power. As explained by George Nicholas to the Virginia Con-
vention, "the Constitution had enumerated all the powers which the
adopted an originalist methodology and examined much of the additional evidence of original
meaning presented here.
13 The only time it was considered was when Madison and Charles Pinckney proposed that it
be modified by inserting the phrase "and establish all offices" because it appeared to them that
this power might be questioned. Their proposal was rejected without discussion by a vote of 9
to 2. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1987) (1893).
14 Id. at 303.
15 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787, at 331 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., rev. 2d ed. 1941) (1836) [hereinafter Debates].
If Id. at 338.
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general government should have, but did not say how they were to be
exercised. It therefore, in this clause, tells how they shall be exer-
cised." 7 Like other Federalists, Nicholas denied that this Clause gave
"any new power" to Congress. "Suppose," he reasoned:
it had been inserted, at the end of every power, that they should have
power to make laws to carry that power into execution; would this have
increased their powers? If, therefore, it could not have increased their
powers, if glaced at the end of each power, it cannot increase them at the
end of all.
In short, "[t] his clause only enables them to carry into execution the
powers given to them, but gives them no additional power." 9 Madi-
son added his voice to the chorus: "the sweeping clause.., only ex-
tended to the enumerated powers. Should Congress attempt to ex-
tend it to any power not enumerated, it would not be warranted by
the clause."2 °
Also in Virginia, Edmund Pendleton, president of the Conven-
tion, insisted that this Clause did not go, "a single step beyond the
delegated powers.,21
If [Congress were] about to pass a law in consequence of this clause, they
must pursue some of the delegated powers, but can by no means depart
from them, or arrogate any new powers; for the plain language of the
clause is, to give them power to pass laws in order to give effect to the
22
delegated powers.
The same point was made in the North Carolina Convention: "This
clause specifies that they shall make laws to carry into execution all the
powers vested by this Constitution; consequently, they can make no laws
to execute any other power. This clause gives no new power, but de-
clares that those already given are to be executed by proper laws."
23
In Pennsylvania, James Wilson explained that this Clause "is saying no
more than that the powers we have already particularly given, shall be
effectually carried into execution."24 And Thomas M'Kean insisted
that "it gives to Congress no further powers than those already enu-
merated.
,25
Here, then, is the likely explanation for the lack of debate sur-
rounding the Clause at the Philadelphia Convention: if the power to
make law was already thought implicit in the enumerated powers
17 3 id. at 245.
is Id. at 245-46.
19 Id. at 246.
20 Id. at 455.
21 Id. at 441.
22 Id.
23 4 id. at 141 (statement of William Maclaine).
24 2 id. at 468.
25 Id. at 537.
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scheme, then it is not surprising that the Clause would provoke no
discussion at the Convention. Joseph Lynch offers a different expla-
nation for the silence of the Convention. He suggests that the word-
ing of the Clause was made deliberately ambiguous so that both sides
could later argue for their favored interpretation. Nationalists from
the Northern and Atlantic states could argue that the Clause was
equivalent to the rejected Bedford Proposal, while the Southern and
rural federalists could argue that Congress was limited to enacting
laws that were incidental to the enumerated powers. The silent re-
ception of the Clause by all sides, he claims, reflected their unwill-
ingness to tamper with the compromise represented by this ambigu-
ity. According to Lynch, "[t]he ambiguity of the language that the
committee proposed and that the convention approved enabled both
sides not only to approve its inclusion in the Constitution but also to
argue afterwards that their construction was in accord with the fram-
ers' intent.",
6
Although the circumstantial evidence he offers on behalf of this
theory is intriguing, it generally relates to the subjective original intent
of the framers, not to the original meaning that the Clause would have
had to a reasonable person at the time of founding. According to
original-meaning originalism, secret intentions are not binding. 7
The issue is what interpretation best reflects the publicly accessible
meaning of the Clause.
Moreover, any ambiguity in the wording was clarified by the Fed-
eralists' public insistence during the ratification that the Clause only
authorized the enactment of laws that were incidental to the enu-
merated powers, and that this power would have been inherent to the
enumerated powers had there been no Necessary and Proper Clause
at the end of the list. In the conventions, we know of no disagree-
ment as to the meaning of the Clause expressed by supporters of the
Constitution. All denied it was the equivalent of the Bedford Pro-
posal. Professor Lynch concedes as much when he observes:
Whatever private understandings the framers may have had among them-
selves-that proponents of a strong national government could be free to
argue, for instance, that the Necessary and Proper Clause included an
undefined bevy of congressional and presidential powers. ..- the
supporters of the Constitution had for the most part publicly disavowed
26 JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 25 (1999). I think Professor Lynch is correct to use the term "ambiguity,"
rather than vagueness for, as we shall see, at issue here is which of two possible meanings of
"necessity" was the meaning conveyed by the term "necessary."
27 See Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, supra note 8, at 620-29 (distinguishing origi-
nal meaning interpretation from that based on original intent, and defending the former).
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avowed such understandings both in the Federalist and in the state con-
ventions in their campaign to secure ratification.2 8
Such public utterances during ratification clarify what the original
public meaning of a term was, and it is that public meaning to which
I now turn.
II. THE MEANING OF "NECESSARY"
Despite the uniform denials by the Constitution's advocates that
the Necessary and Proper Clause expanded the powers of the na-
tional government, a national bank was proposed to the Federalist-
dominated first Congress by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton. There ensued the most hotly contested constitutional
conflict of the early years of the Constitution2 9 Official opinions on
the subject were issued by Attorney General Edmund Randolph, Sec-
retary of State Thomas Jefferson, and Hamilton. Of these, Randolph
and Jefferson argued against its constitutionality, with Hamilton argu-
ing in favor. Among the leaders in the House who contended that
the bank was unconstitutional was James Madison. The ambiguity of
the term "necessary" was quickly revealed by this controversy, requir-
ing us to decide which meaning was the original one.3O
A. "Necessary" Means Really Necessary: Madison, Jefferson & Randolph
The opening salvo on the constitutionality of the proposed bank
was fired by James Madison, who was serving as a member of the first
Congress, when on February 2, 1791, he delivered a lengthy speech
on the merits of the bank bill. His speech began with "a general re-
view of the advantages and disadvantages of Banks, 3' but in making
these remarks "he had reserved to himself the right to deny the au-
thority of Congress to pass it."
3 2
Before addressing the constitutionality of the bill, he first pro-
vided a list of principles that should guide constitutional interpreta-
tion and construction:
An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the Govern-
ment cannot be just.
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may be,
are to be admitted-where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its conse-
quences.
28 LYNCH, supra note 26, at 112.
29 The Alien and Sedition Acts were not enacted until 1798.
s0 On the difference for originalist interpretation between textual ambiguity and vagueness,
see Barnett, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 852-56.
31 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
32 Id. at 1945.
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In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if
to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.
Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence
of the meaning of the parties.
In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the degree
of its incidentality to an express authority is to be regarded, but the de-
gree of its importance also; since on this will depend the probability or
improbability of its being left to construction. 3
Notice that Madison implicitly distinguished between an explicit
power (which is a matter of interpretation "where a meaning is
clear") and one that is only implicit (and "left to construction") .3
Given that the power to establish a bank or issue charters of incorpo-
ration was not explicitly granted, and viewing the Constitution in
light of these principles, Madison was led to conclude that "it was not
possible to discover in it the power to incorporate a Bank."
3 5
Madison thought this conclusion was compelled both by general
principles of congressional power and by the specific powers being
invoked on behalf of the bank. On general principle:
All power.., had its limits; those of the general government were ceded
from the mass of general power inherent in the people, and were conse-
quently confined within the bound fixed by their act of cession. The
constitution was this act; and to warrant Congress in exercising the
power, the grant of it should be pointed out in that instrument ....
In Madison's view, "this... had not been done," and he "presumed it
could not be done. 37 When it came to constitutional construction,
"such construction only was admissible as carefully preserved entire
the idea on which that constitution is founded."3 8
Supporters of the bank had argued that it was justified as inciden-
tal to the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States"39 and the power "[t]o borrow
33 Id. at 1946.
34 See KEITH E. WHIT-rINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999) (distinguishing between interpretation and
construction); KEITH E. WHrrI-INGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-19 (1999) (discussing interpretation and construction, and argu-
ing that construction is necessary to complement interpretation because constitutional inter-
pretation cannot answer every constitutional question).
35 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
36 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH
1791, at 379 (William Charles DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995). This passage is found in an
article in The General Advertiser, February 7, 1791. It does not appear in the lengthier and oth-
erwise more detailed report of Madison's speech included in the Annals of Congress, which was
originally published in the Gazette of the United States, February 23, 1791.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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money on the credit of the United States., 40 Madison noted that no
argument could be based on the terms "provide for the common De-
fence and general Welfare of the United States," because these terms
pertained only to the purpose for exercising the taxing power and
these "general purposes themselves were limited and explained by
the particular enumeration subjoined."
4'
In other words, according to Madison, Congress could use taxes to
provide for the common defense and general welfare only when ex-
ercising the other powers that were enumerated in Article I. The tax-
ing power could not be used to pursue any end that might be thought
conducive to the common defense or the general welfare. Why not?
"To understand these terms in any sense, that would justify the power
in question, would give to Congress an unlimited power; would ren-
der nugatory the enumeration of particular powers; would supersede
all the powers reserved to the State Governments.0
2
Madison noted that the terms "common defence" and "general
welfare" had been "copied from the articles of Confederation" and
asked rhetorically whether it had "ever been pretended, that they
were to be understood otherwise than as here explained?" 43 Nor
could the bill be justified as a direct exercise of the borrowing power;
"It does not borrow a shilling."44 If anything, it created the power to
lend, not borrow.
Madison then turned his attention to the Necessary and Proper
Clause. In a crucial passage of his speech he stated:
Whatever meaning this clause may have, none can be admitted, that
would give an unlimited discretion to Congress.
Its meaning must, according to the natural and obvious force of the
terms and the context, be limited to means necessary to the end, and in-
cident to the nature of the specified powers.
The clause is in fact merely declaratory of what would have resulted
by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and, as it were, technical
means of executing those powers. In this sense it has been explained by
the friends of the Constitution, and ratified by the State Conventions.
40 Id., cl. 2.
41 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
42 Id.
43 Id. The Articles of Confederation, Article VIII, had provided that "[a]ll charges of war, and all
other expences that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed
by the united states in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," and, in
Article IX, that "The united states in congress assembled shall never ... ascertain the sums and
expences necessary for the defence and welfare of the united states ... unless by the votes of a
majority of the united states in congress assembled." In both instances, the terms "common
defence" and "general welfare" qualified the spending power of Congress. It was not a free
standing power of its own.
"1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
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The essential characteristic of the Government, as composed of limited and
enumerated powers, would be destroyed, if instead of direct and incidental
means, any means could be used which, in the language of the preamble
to the bill, "might be conceived to be conducive to the successful con-
ducting of the finances, or might be conceived to tend to give facility to
the obtaining of loans."
45
Distinguishing between interpretation and construction, Madison
noted "the diffusive and ductile interpretation of these words and the
boundless latitude of construction given them by the friends of the
bank."46 He contended "that by their construction" of the Necessary
and Proper Clause "every possible power might be exercised. The
government would then be paramount in all possible cases... and
every limitation effectually swept away. ,' For this reason, "[t] he doc-
trine of implication, he warned the friends to this system, was a dan-
,,48
gerous one.
Madison thought that trying to justify the constitutionality of a na-
tional bank as necessary for carrying into execution an enumerated
power required too great a stretch:
Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. To
borrow money is made the end, and the accumulation of capitals implied
as the means. The accumulation of capitals is then the end, and a Bank
implied as the means. The Bank is then the end, and a charter of incor-
poration, a monopoly, capital punishments, &c. implied as the means.
If implications, thus remote and thus multiplied, can be linked to-
gether, a chain may be formed that will reach every object of legislation,
49
every object within the whole compass of political economy.
Nine years later, in discussing another claim of power by Congress,
Jefferson as president would compare this style of argument to the
child's game "This is the House thatJack Built.'
50
Madison gave several examples of enumerated powers that were
not left to implication, though if a latitudinarian interpretation of the
45 Id. at 1947-48 (emphasis added).
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH
1791, supra note 36, at 380.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1948-49 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
50 In criticizing a House bill incorporating a company for the Roosevelt copper mines in
New Jersey, President Jefferson observed that its supporters justified its constitutionality under
the sweeping clause of the Constitution by offering the following pedigree of necessities:
Congress are authorized to defend the nation. Ships are necessary for defence; copper is
necessary for ships; mines necessary for copper; a company necessary to work mines; and
who can doubt this reasoning who has ever played at "This is the House thatJack Built?"
Under such a process of filiation of necessities the sweeping clause makes clean work.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 30, 1800), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 165 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., memorial ed. 1903).
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Necessary and Proper Clause were correct, they surely could have
been.
Congress have power "to regulate the value of money;" yet it is ex-
pressly added, not left to be implied, that counterfeiters may be pun-
ished.
They have the power "to declare war," to which armies are more inci-
dent, than incorporated banks to borrowing; yet the power "to raise and
support armies" is expressly added; and to this again, the express power
"to make rules and regulations for the government of armies;" a like re-
mark is applicable to the powers as to the navy.
The regulation and calling out of the militia are more appurtenant to
war than the proposed Bank to borrowing; yet the former is not left to
construction.
The very power to borrow money is a less remote implication from
the power of war, than an incorporated monopoly Bank from the power
of borrowing; yet, the power to borrow is not left to implication.5'
Madison did not mean to exaggerate the significance of these sorts of
drafting decisions: "It is not pretended that every insertion or omis-
sion in the Constitution is the effect of systematic attention. This is
not the character of any human work, particularly the work of a body
of men."52 Yet he thought that these examples "with others that
might be added, sufficiently inculcate, nevertheless, a rule of inter-
pretation very different from that on which the bill rests. They con-
demn the exercise of any power, particularly a great and important
power, which is not evidently and necessarily involved in an express
power.""
Madison offered a distinction "which he said had not been suffi-
ciently kept in view., 54 This is the distinction between (a) a power
that is "necessary and proper for the Government or Union"" and
(b) a power that is, "necessary and proper for executing the enumer-
ated powers. The only powers that are necessary and proper for
the national government are those that were enumerated; the only
proper unenumerated powers are those derived from the nature of a
power that was expressed.
[This expression of particular powers (and no others)] constituted the
peculiar nature of the Government, no power, therefore, not enumer-
ated could be inferred from the general nature of Government. Had the
power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary
51 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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it might have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or sup-
plied by an amendment of the Constitution.
Madison then offered the crucial distinction between "necessity"
and "convenience." "But the proposed Bank could not even be
called necessary to the Government; at most it could be but conven-
ient."" There were many other ways, short of exercising this power to
incorporate a bank, for the government to accomplish its enumer-
ated objects or end.
Madison read portions of the ratification debates in which critics
of the Constitution seized upon the Necessary and Proper Clause as
evidence of the "dangerous latitude of its powers, 59 and its supporters
argued that this Clause was to be interpreted as Madison had just
done before Congress.
The defence against the charge founded on the want of a bill of
rights pre-supposed, he said, that the powers not given were retained;
and that those given were not to be extended by remote implications.
On any other supposition, the power of Congress to abridge the freedom
of the press, or the rights of conscience, &c. could not have been dis-
proved.
The explanations in the State Conventions all turned on the same
fundamental principle, and on the principle that the terms necessary and
proper gave no additional powers to those enumerated.
6 °
As was shown above, the record bears out Madison's characterization.
Madison also made a crucial connection between the Necessary
and Proper Clause and the protection of the rights retained by and
powers reserved to the people by citing the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments in support of this "rule of interpretation." Of course,
in February of 1791, these amendments had yet to be ratified, and on
that date were the eleventh and twelfth on the list of amendments
then pending before states. Perhaps because he referred to them by
these numbers, this use by Madison in a constitutional argument of
the Ninth Amendment, which he himself had devised, had, until re-
cently, largely been ignored. "The latitude of interpretation required
by the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the Constitution it-
self."6 ' As authority for this rule he offered this:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at
least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now
contended for .... He read several of the articles proposed, remarking
particularly on the 11th [the Ninth Amendment] and 12th [the Tenth
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1951.
6 Id.
1 Id. at 1949.
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Amendment], the former, as guarding against a latitude of interpreta-
tion; the latter, as excluding every source of power not within the Consti-
tution itself.6-
Thus, for Madison, whether or not a proposed action of govern-
ment that restricted the liberty of the people was necessary, and
therefore within the powers of Congress to enact, required some as-
sessment of whether the means chosen were essential to the pursuit
of an enumerated end. Without this assessment, the scheme of lim-
ited enumerated powers would unravel. In his words, allowing the
exercise of a power that was neither specifically enumerated, nor
fairly inferred from one that is, "involves the guilt of usurpation, and
establishes a precedent of interpretation, levelling all the barriers
which limit the powers of the General Government.
In Congress, Madison was joined by Representative Michael Stone
of Maryland, a lawyer by training, who argued forcefully against the
doctrine of implied powers which he characterized "as a serpent
which was to sting and poison the constitution."4 Stone rested his
argument in part on the ratification debates in which "all those who
opposed the government, dreaded this doctrine-those who advo-
cated it, declared that it could not be resorted to-and all combined
in opinion that it ought not to be tolerated." 6-5 If the doctrine of im-
plied powers was to be accepted, all the framers need have done was
write the preamble "and then said-Here is your constitution! Here
is your bill of rights! Do these gentlemen require any thing more re-
specting the powers of Congress, than a description of the ends of
government?"6 Stone also stressed the fact that the constitution was
in writing. "[T]he end of all government is the public good-and if
the means were left to legislation, all written compacts were nuga-
tory."67 It was "the sober discretion of the legislature ... [that] was
the very thing intended to be curbed and restrained by our constitu-
tion.'68
Another lawyer, JamesJackson of Georgia, observed:
If the sweeping clause, as it is called, extends to vesting Congress with
such powers, and necessary and proper means are an indispensable implica-
tion in the sense advanced by the advocates of the bill, we shall soon be
62 Id. at 1951.
63 Id.
64 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRsT FEDERAL CONGRESS 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH
1791, supra note 36, at 424.
65 Id.
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in possession of all possible powers, and the charter under which we sit
69will be nothing but a name.
Representative William Giles of Virginia defined necessary as "that
mean without which the end could not be produced. 70 He rejected
the suggestion that, "necessary, as applicable to a mean to produce an
end, should be construed so as to produce the greatest possible quan-
tum of public utility.
71
[That definition], if pursued, will be found to teem with dangerous ef-
fects, and would justify the assumption of any given authority whatever.
Terms are to be so construed as to produce the greatest degree of public
utility. Congress are to be the judges of this degree of utility. This utility,
when decided on, will be the ground of constitutionality. Hence, any
measure may be proved constitutional, which Congress may judge to be
useful. These deductions would suborn the Constitution itself, and blot
out the great distinguishing characteristic of the free Constitutions of
America, as compared with the despotic Governments of Europe, which
consist in having the boundaries of governmental authority clearly
marked out and ascertained.72
In other words, "[i]f expediency constituted constitutionality; the
House judged of the expediency; then every measure they could pos-
sibly enter into would be ipso facto constitutional: And what would
then be the weight it was intended that the constitution should have;
and where were its limits?
73
In the executive branch, President Washington solicited the views
of Attorney General Edmond Randolph, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson, and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton on the
measure's constitutionality. A few days after the close of debate in
Congress, Randolph and Jefferson conveyed their formal opinions to
the President that the bill was unconstitutional largely for the same
reasons enunciated by Madison. Randolph, who had served as a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention from Virginia, wrote, "let it
be propounded as an eternal question to those who build new powers
on this clause, whether the latitude of construction, which they arro-
gate will not terminate in an unlimited power in Congress.,
7
1
In his formal opinion, Jefferson drew the same distinction as
Madison had between necessity and convenience:
69 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1967 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 1993.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH
1791, supra note 36, at 449.
74 Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to President
Washington (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES, at 86, 89 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley 1967)
(1832) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE BANK].
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[T]he constitution allows only the means which are "necessary," not
those which are merely convenient for effecting the enumerated powers.
If such a latitude of construction be allowed to this phrase, as to give any
non enumerated power, it will go to every one; for there is no one, which
ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in some way or other, to some
one of so long a list of enumerated powers: it would swallow up all the
delegated powers .... Therefore it was that the constitution restrained
them to the necessary means; that is to say, to those means, without which
the grant of the power would be nugatory.
Jefferson then allowed that "[p]erhaps, indeed, bank bills may be a
more convenient vehicle than treasury orders." 76 Despite this, "a little
difference in the degree of convenience cannot constitute the necessity,
which the constitution makes the ground for assuming any non enu-
merated power.,
77
As Madison summarized their argument:
[the construction of power exercised by the bank bill] was condemned by
the silence of the Constitution; was condemned by the rule of interpreta-
tion arising out of the Constitution; was condemned by its tendency to
destroy the main characteristic of the Constitution; was condemned by
the expositions of the friends of the Constitution, whilst depending be-
fore the public; was condemned by the apparent intention of the parties
which ratified the Constitution; was condemned by the explanatory
amendments proposed by Congress themselves to the Constitution; and
he hoped it would receive its final condemnation by the vote of this
House. 78
It did not.
B. "Necessary" Means "Convenient". Hamilton and Marshall
A week after Randolph and Jefferson issued their opinions, Ham-
ilton, who had initially proposed the creation of the bank, defended
the constitutionality of his proposal. As part of his very lengthy opin-
ion, he offered an alternative interpretation of the term "necessary."
According to both the "grammatical" and "popular" sense of the
term,
necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or
conducive to. It is a common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary
for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing
more is intended or understood than that the interest of the Government
75 Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, on the Same Subject (Feb. 15, 1791),
reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 74, at 93.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1952 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
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or person require, or will be promoted by, the doing of this or that
thing.
Hamilton maintained that "[t]he whole turn of the clause con-
taining it, indicates that it was the intent of the convention, by that
clause, to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specified pow-
ers." ° Hamilton wrote:
[To adopt Jefferson's (and Madison's) interpretation] would be to de-
part from its obvious and popular sense, and to give it a restrictive opera-
tion; an idea never before entertained. It would be to give it the same
force as if the word absolutely, or indispensably, had been prefixed to it.
Such a construction would beget endless uncertainty and embarrass-
ment. The cases must be palpable and extreme, in which it could be
pronounced with certainty, that a measure was absolutely necessa7; or
one, without which the exercise of a given power would be nugatory.
Hamilton also responded to the argument that a broad construc-
tion of this power would undermine the enumerated powers scheme.
His argument highlights the distinction between interpretation and
construction.
The same thing has been said, and may be said, with regard to every ex-
ercise of power, by implication or construction. The moment the literal
meaning is departed from, there is a chance of error and abuse: and yet
an adherence to the letter of its powers would at once arrest the motion
of Government ....
The truth is, that difficulties on this point are inherent in the nature
of the federal constitution. They result inevitably from a division of legis-
lative power. The consequence of this division is, that there will be cases
clearly within the power of the National Government, others, clearly
without its power; and a third class, which will leave room for controversy
and difference of opinion, and concerning which a reasonable latitude of
judgment must be allowed."'
In evaluating his argument, it is perhaps worth remembering that
Hamilton had four years earlier proposed to the Constitutional Con-
vention a scheme of consolidated government in which the legisla-
ture of the United States would have been given "power to pass all
laws whatsoever, 8 3 subject only to a nonoverridable veto power by the
79 Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 23,
1791), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 74, at 97-98.
so Id. at 98.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 99.
83 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 291 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) (Madison quoting Hamilton). Although several different versions of Hamilton's pro-
posal were recorded, none of these reports apparently differs on this aspect of his proposal. 3
id. at 617-19 (describing the "considerable differences" of the versions of Hamilton's proposal
with no mention of any variation on his proposed grant of power to the legislature to "pass all
laws whatsoever").
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supreme executive authority. He contemplated no enumeration of
powers or allocation of powers between state and national govern-
ments. Hamilton introduced his plan in a lengthy speech to the con-
vention, immediately after which the convention adjourned without
discussion. It was never explicitly considered thereafter. Later the
convention rejected the somewhat more qualified language proposed
by Gunning Bedford of Delaware that would have given Congress
power "to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union,
and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompe-
tent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation. ' 4
In the bank dispute, Hamilton, as the behind-the-scenes leader of
the fledgling "Federalist" party that dominated Congress, gained the
crucial support of the esteemed Washington and prevailed on the
bank.8 ' Congress enacted the bank bill over the objections of the
congressmen noted above, and Washington signed it into law over
the objections of Jefferson and Randolph. Still, though several mem-
bers of Congress had argued that the bank was constitutional-and
this position prevailed-we cannot entirely be sure whether this was
because a majority in Congress rejected a narrow conception of ne-
cessity or because a majority of the members thought the bank met
the more stringent standard put forward by Madison and others.
The meaning of the "necessary and proper clause" was first con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in 1805 in the case of United States v.
Fisher. In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall interpreted the
Clause to give almost complete discretion to Congress. He said,
"Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered
to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a
power granted by the constitution. " s But Marshall gave his fullest,
most careful, and most well-known treatment of this Clause some
thirty years after the ratification of the Constitution in McCulloch v.
Maryland s9 a case involving the constitutionality of the legislation es-
84 2 id. at 131-32.
85 This controversy was among those that contributed to Jefferson (and Madison) eventually
splitting from the Federalists and founding the competing "Republican" party. This party,
dubbed "democrat" by the Federalists-a term of opprobrium-eventually took that name as its
own and survives as the Democratic Party that exists today. The Federalist party eventually col-
lapsed, was initially supplanted by the 'Whigs, and then by the abolitionist Republican party-
the party we know by that name today. Until the twentieth century, the Democrats largely
maintained their Jeffersonian commitment to "strict construction" of federal powers, with the
Republicans favoring more expansive construction of those powers.
86 Of course, a third possibility cannot definitively be disproved: the Federalist-dominated
Congress knowingly exceeded its enumerated powers under the Constitution.
87 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
88 Id. at 396.
89 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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tablishing a second national bank. In his 1819 opinion, still often
cited by the Supreme Court, Marshall adopted, in some places almost
word for word, the opinion Hamilton issued as Secretary of the
Treasury.
In McCulloch, Maryland had challenged the constitutionality of the
bank by asserting a narrow conception of necessity:
But the laws which they are authorized to make, are to be such as are nec-
essary and proper for this purpose. No terms could be found in the lan-
guage, more absolutely excluding a general and unlimited discretion
than these. It is not "necessary or proper," but "necessary and proper."
The means used must have both these qualities. It must be, not merely
convenient-fit-adapted-proper, to the accomplishment of the end in
view; it must likewise be necessary for the accomplishment of that end.
Many means may be proper, which are not necessary; because the end may
be attained without them. The word "necessary," is said to be a synonyme
of "needful." But both these words are defined "indispensably requisite,"
and, most certainly, this is the sense in which the word "necessary" is used
in the constitution. To give it a more lax sense, would be to alter the
whole character of the government as a sovereignty of limited powers.
This is not a purpose for which violence should be done to the obvious
and natural sense of any terms, used in an instrument drawn up with
great simplicity, and with extraordinary precision.9°
Echoing Hamilton, Marshall rejected this argument adopting in-
stead the meaning that Madison, Jefferson, and Maryland had posed
as its opposite-"necessary" means convenient:
If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in
approved authors, we find that [the word "necessary"] frequently imports
no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to an-
other. To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally under-
stood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as
being confined to those single means, without which the end would be
entirely unattainable. 9'
Marshall's textual and functional defense of this definition of "neces-
sary" is well known to law students. Unlike Madison's bank speech,
Marshall's opinion is a central part of every casebook on constitu-
tional law.
Textually, Marshall contrasted the use of the term "necessary" in
this Clause with the term "absolutely necessary" used in Article I, Sec-
9o Id. at 366-67 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 413-14.
92 However, one casebook unconventionally leads with Madison's speech, placing it before
both McCulloch and Marbury. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 8-11 (4th ed. 2000).
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tion 10, 93 arguing that it is "impossible to compare the sen-
tence [s] ... without feeling a conviction that the convention under-
stood itself to change materially the meaning of the word 'necessary,'
by prefixing the word 'absolutely.' 94 Thus, he argued it is a mistake,
as a textual matter, to equate the term necessary with the term abso-
lutely necessary, as the State of Maryland purportedly did.95 This ar-
gument has greatly impressed later interpreters.
Functionally, Marshall argued:
It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to in-
sure, so far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.
This could not be done, by confiding the choice of means to such narrow
limits as not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might
be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end .... To have de-
clared, that the best means shall not be used, but those alone, without
which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive
the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. 96
Marshall's functional argument depends upon the fear that the
national government will fail without the sort of discretionary powers
that his interpretation allows. As important, it assumes that this open-
ended grant of discretionary powers will not eventually undermine
the enumerated powers scheme as Madison predicted.
He dismissed, almost casually, concerns about how such an open-
ended grant of discretionary power squared with the theory of lim-
ited and enumerated powers.
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it,
would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those
arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before
the people, found it necessary to urge; that principle is now universally
admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually
granted, is perpetually arisin , and will probably continue to arise, so
long as our system shall exist.
And, just as Madison had given examples of enumerated powers that
were not left to implication, Marshall offered three examples of un-
enumerated powers that had already been implied, even though they
were arguably not "indispensably necessary" to the accomplishment
of some enumerated purpose: the implied powers to carry mail be-
93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for exe-
cuting its inspection Laws .... ").
94 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414-15.
95 In its brief, quoted above, the State of Maryland did not use this phrase, though it did use
the phrase "indispensably requisite." Id. at 367.
96 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
97 Id. at 405.
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tween post offices and along post roads, to punish any violations of
its laws,' and to require congressional oaths of office.'0
There are any number of quite plausible responses to these ex-
amples that someone employing Jefferson and Madison's conception
of necessity could make. The power to carry mail can surely be con-
sidered, in Madison's words, both requisite to and "incident to the
nature"'0 ' of the postal power. Similarly, the power to punish viola-
tions is clearly incident, if not identical, to the nature of the law-
making power. For many, a legislative enactment with no sanctions
for disobedience can hardly be called a law. In contrast, the power to
require congressional oaths of office may well be inessential to the
performance of government.0 2  Let candidates for office challenge
their opponents to take such an oath or suffer the electoral conse-
quences the way they now do with promises pledging term limits and
no new taxes. If the inability to require congressional oaths is the
price for holding Congress to its enumerated powers, a Madisonian
might contend it is a price well worth paying.
Although Madison, as President, had actually signed into law the
bill establishing the national bank that Marshall upheld as constitu-
tional,'0 ' it is significant that Madison took immediate exception to
98 Id. at 417 ("It may be said, with some plausibility, that the right to carry the mail, and to
punish those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post-office and
post-road.").
Id. ("The several powers of congress may exist, in a very imperfect state, to be sure, but
they may exist and be carried into execution, although no punishment should be inflicted, in
cases where the right to punish is not expressly given.").
100 Id. at 416 ("The power to exact this security for the faithful performance of duty, is not
given, nor is it indispensably necessary.").
101 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
102 A mandatory congressional oath might be considered a qualification for holding office in
addition to those mandated by Article I, Sections 2 and 3, and thus beyond the powers of Con-
gress to impose. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (limiting Congress to judging
only the qualifications for membership enumerated in Article I, Section 2). On the other hand,
an oath requirement might be considered a procedural rule within the powers of each house to
determine for itself rather than a law. On either theory, an oath requirement is either permis-
sible or impermissible independent of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
10s Assuming Marshall was correct in claiming that a Madisonian conception of necessity
would mean that a mandatory congressional oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
tion lies outside the powers of Congress, a Madisonian might respond that a Congress that im-
posed such a requirement would be violating the terms of such an oath.
104 Madison later justified his decision by citing the precedent established by the long-
standing acquiescence to the claimed power as well as by the expediency of the bank: "A veto
from the Executive, under these circumstances, with an admission of the expediency and almost
necessity of the measure, would have been a defiance of all the obligations derived from a course
of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of the national judgment and intention."
Letter from James Madison to Mr. Ingersoll Uune 25, 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, at 186 (London, R. Worthington 1884) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
LETTERS]. Of course, Madison may well have been wrong constitutionally to have signed the
bill.
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Marshall's opinion in McCulloch, renewing the argument he had
made as a congressman nearly thirty years before:
[O]f most importance is the high sanction given to a latitude in ex-
pounding the Constitution, which seems to break down the landmarks
intended by a specification of the powers of Congress, and to substitute,
for a definite connection between means and ends, a legislative discre-
tion as to the former, to which no practical limit can be assigned. 
5
Madison then acknowledged that the national economy is intercon-
nected-a supposedly modem development unknown to the foun-
ders-and then rejected it as a basis for a latitudinarian interpreta-
tion of "necessary":
In the great system of political economy, having for its general object the
national welfare, everything is related immediately or remotely to every other
thing, and, consequently, a power over any one thing, if not limited by
some obvious and precise affinity, may amount to a power over every
other. Ends and means may shift their character at the will and accord-
ing to the ingenuity of the legislative body.1
6
He commented further, "Is there a legislative power, in fact, not ex-
pressly prohibited by the Constitution, which might not, according to
the doctrine of the court, be exercised as a means of carrying into ef-
fect some specified power?"0 7
Virginian John Taylor, a contemporary of Madison and Marshall,
penned an entire book protesting the reasoning of McCulloch. In
Construction Construed, and Constitutions Vindicated, he argued that
"[t]here are two kinds of construction; one calculated to maintain,
the other to corrupt or destroy the principles upon which govern-
ments are established.' "Necessities," he argued, "are, strictly,
things unavoidable .... The plain question, divested of verbal evolu-
tions, is, whether congress are invested with the supreme power of al-
tering or mending the constitution, should they imagine it to be ex-
pedient?"' 9 When necessity is taken to mean expedient, "this mode
of construction completely establishes the position, that congress may
pass any internal law whatsoever in relation to things, because there is
nothing with which, war, commerce and taxation may not be closely
or remotely connected.""0
05 Letter from James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS, supra note 104,
at 143.
106 Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 144.
108 JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 21 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1998) (1820).
109 Id. at 169.
to Id. at 170.
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Taylor further objected to Marshall's repeated reliance on the
concept of "sovereignty" to justify discretionary congressional
power."' He wrote:
I do not know how it has happened, that this word has crept into our po-
litical dialect .... Neither the declaration of independence, nor the fed-
eral constitution, nor the constitution of any single state, uses this
equivocal and illimitable word ....
In fact, the term "sovereignty," was sacrilegiously stolen from the at-
tributes of God, and impiously assumed by kings. Though they commit-
ted the theft, aristocracies and republicks have claimed the spoil.
Because sovereignty "is neither fiduciary nor capable of limitation,"
3
Taylor believed it gave rise to the "new idea of 'sovereign servants,'
[by which] our legislatures are converted into British parliaments,
daily new-modelling the substance of our government, by bodies poli-
tick, exclusive privileges, pensions, bounties, and judicial acts, com-
prising an arbitrary power of dispensing wealth or poverty to indi-
viduals and combinations, at their pleasure."
4
C. So Who Was Right? Perhaps They All Were
What was the prevailing meaning of the term "necessary" when
the Constitution was enacted? This question is addressed at some
length by Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger. 1' They note that the
1755 and 1785 editions of Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English
Language "define 'necessary' as '1. Needful; indispensably requisite. 2.
Not free; fatal; impelled by fate. 3. Conclusive; decisive by inevitable
consequence.""' 6 This definition explicitly includes the meaning at-
tached to the term "necessity" by the State of Maryland in its brief. It
does not include the terms "convenient or useful" which Marshall fol-
lowing Hamilton claimed to be a popular connotation of the term.
Nevertheless, although they abstain from a final position on the is-
sue, Lawson and Granger express sympathy for Marshall's interpreta-
II An example of Marshall's reliance can be found in his discussion of the people and sover-
eignty:
[W]hen, "in order to form a more perfect union," it was deemed necessary to change
this alliance into an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and
acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving
its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819); Id. at 409 ("The original power of
giving the law on any subject whatever, is a sovereign power.").
112 TAYLOR, supra note 108, at 25-26.
113 Id. at 27.
114 Id. at 1-2.
115 Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Inter/etation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE LJ. 267, 286-89 (1993).
Id. at 286.
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tion based on the usage of the term "necessary" in the Constitution
itself. In particular, they concede that the contrast between the term
"necessary" in the Sweeping Clause and the use of the term "abso-
lutely necessary" in Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 "strongly suggests
that 'necessary,' by itself, does not connote indispensability."'' To
this they add the language of Article II, Section 3 instructing "the
President to recommend to Congress 'such Measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient.' 8 If 'necessary' means 'indispensa-
ble,"' they contend, "it is hard to understand why it would be con-
joined with a term like 'expedient,' which suggests only a minimal
requirement of usefulness."'
On the other hand, if "necessary" means merely "convenient or
useful," as Hamilton and Marshall contended, it is hard to see what
the term "necessary" adds to the term "expedient." From this stand-
point, the meaning of "necessary and expedient" is as elusive as it is
redundant. Perhaps this is why Marshall himself did not point to Ar-
ticle II, Section 3. Because it is equally incompatible with both mean-
ings of "necessary," this passage does not help us distinguish between
one meaning and the other.
What about Marshall's strongest textual argument-the contrast
between "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the use
of "absolutely necessary" in Article I, Section 10, Clause 2? Recall that
Marshall said it was "impossible to compare the sentence.., without
feeling a conviction, that the convention understood itself to change
materially the meaning of the word 'necessary,' by prefixing the word
'absolutely."120 But a review of the Convention notes suggests consid-
erably less deliberation on this choice.
The Necessary and Proper Clause emerged from the Committee
on Detail and was left unmodified by the Committee on Style. In
contrast, Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 was proposed from the floor
by George Mason (who sat on neither committee) on the last day of
deliberation and the very day that the Constitution was voted on and
approved, Saturday, September 15. (It was written up and signed two
days later on Monday, September 17.) Mason's eleventh hour pro-
posal was adopted without debate in the midst of a host of last minute
adjustments. This hardly suggests a deliberate change of meaning.
Moreover, Mason was seeking to qualify a previously agreed upon
prohibition against the states imposing any imposts or duties without
the consent of Congress. Mason's language carves out an exception
to this prohibition by granting the states the power to levy only those
117 Id. at 288.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414-15 (1819).
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imposts that were necessary to pay for their inspection laws. Given
that one of the prime reasons for the new Constitution was to prevent
state interference with commerce, it is easy to understand why Mason
would have proposed explicitly stringent restrictions on this excep-
tion.
Finally, Mason tended to favor the term "indispensably necessary"
when speaking of grants of power and used the phrase frequently
when speaking in the Virginia Ratification Convention. For example,
while expressing his concerns about granting Congress the jurisdic-
tion to govern the federal district, he expressed that he "was very will-
ing to give them, in this as well as in all other cases, those powers
which he thought indispensably necessary."2 1  Indeed the official
Journal of the Convention records Mason's proposal that became Ar-
ticle I, Section 10, Clause 2 as reading "indispensably necessary"
rather than "absolutely necessary."
22
All these factors, more than any deliberate distinction on the part
of the Convention, explain the different usages in the two passages.
Given its source, its last-minute nature, and its purpose, it is not at all
clear that the choice of language "absolutely necessary" says much of
anything about the meaning of the unqualified term "necessary" con-
joined with "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
On the other hand, my previous references to the Convention de-
bates have been offered to illustrate the public meaning of words
used by the framers. In contrast, this evidence about the origin of the
phrase "absolutely necessary" in Article I, Section 10 reflects the sort
of "secret usage" foreclosed by original meaning originalism. If the
intratextual comparison of "necessary" with "absolutely necessary"
conveyed the public meaning that "necessary" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause meant something less than "absolutely necessary," then
evidence of how the two phrases came to be incorporated in the text
is immaterial, provided that the legislative history was unknown, as it
was, to the general public. Moreover, the phrase "indispensably nec-
essary" was in common parlance at the time and was often used in the
Convention and in other public statements. It would certainly have
been possible for the Committee on Detail to have adopted that ter-
21 3 DEBATES, supra note 15, at 432.
1 The Journal ofthe Federal Convention notes:
It was moved and seconded to substitute, for 1st part of clause 2d, section 10th, arti-
cle 1st, the words,
"No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on im-
ports or exports, except what may be indispensably necessary for executing its inspection
laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports or ex-
ports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be
subject to the revision and control of the Congress;"
which passed in the affirmative.
Journal of the Federal Convention, in 1 DEBATES, supra note 15, at 313 (emphasis added).
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minology in the Necessary and Proper Clause had it wished to
unambiguously convey that meaning.
Nevertheless, the intratextual comparison of "necessary" in the
Necessary and Proper Clause with "absolutely necessary" in Article I,
Section 10 overlooks a significant fact. Although Madison strongly
opposed equating necessity with mere convenience, in his bank
speech he also rejected the suggestion that "necessary" meant "indis-
pensably necessary." Instead, he favored "a more liberal construc-
tion" because "very few acts of the legislature could be proved essen-
tially necessary to the absolute existence of government.'
23
Madison urged that the words be "understood so as to permit the
adoption of measures the best calculated to attain the ends of gov-
ernment, and produce the greatest quantum of public utility.' '2 4 His
reason was that " [i] n the Constitution, the great ends of government
were particularly enumerated; but all the means were not, nor could
they all be, pointed out, without making the Constitution a complete
code of laws: some discretionary power, and reasonable latitude,
must be left to the judgment of the legislature.','1 For example, al-
though the Constitution had given Congress the power to lay and col-
lect taxes, "the quantum, nature, means of collecting, &c., were of
necessity left to the honest and sober discretion of the legislature."
26
In his final remark on the constitutionality of the bank, Madison said,
"no power could be exercised by Congress, if the letter of the Consti-
tution was strictly adhered to, and no latitude of construction al-
lowed, and all the good that might be reasonably expected from an
efficient government entirely frustrated. "2
7
It seems then that Marshall-and most later commentators who
rely solely upon his opinion in McCulloch--was considering a false di-
chotomy between mere "convenience" on the one hand and "abso-
lute necessity" on the other. All parties to the first bank debate
agreed that absolute necessity was not required, but at the same time
all agreed that some degree of means-end fit was needed. As Hamil-
ton stated in a passage of his opinion to Washington that is not usu-
ally emphasized, "[tihe relation between the measure and the end; between
the nature of the mean employed towards the execution of a power,
and the object of that power; must be the criterion of constitutionality; not
the more or less of necessity or utility.' '128 In modern terms, a showing
of necessity should neither be so "strict" that no statute can pass mus-




127 Id. at 417-18.
128 Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 23,
1794), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 74, at 98 (emphasis altered).
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ter nor so lenient that any statute can pass. The appropriate "level of
scrutiny" of a measure's necessity must lie somewhere in between.1
2
4,
Even Marshall's opinion in McCulloch can be read as taking a more
circumspect view of congressional power than is commonly taught. I
have already mentioned Marshall's earlier interpretation of the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause in United States v. Fisher, where he con-
tended that "Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be
empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the ex-
ercise of a power granted by the constitution.',3 0 Here one indeed
finds the very open-ended interpretation attributed by others to Mar-
shall's opinion in McCulloch.
Yet in Fisher, as David Currie notes,
Marshall's rejection of a straw man had led him unjustifiably to the oppo-
site extreme: that Congress has some latitude in the choice of means
need not mean it may employ any "which are in fact conducive to the ex-
ercise of a power granted by the constitution." Virtually anything Con-
gress might want to do could meet that criterion ....
By contrast, Currie contends that, in McCulloch, Marshall was more
careful than he had been in Fisher
The means chosen must be "plainly" adapted to the end, not merely
conducive to it; tenuous connections to granted powers will not pass
muster. It must in addition be "appropriate," which implies some super-
vision of the reasonableness of the means. It must not, Marshall added in
a later paragraph, be a mere "pretext... for the accomplishment of ob-
jects not entrusted to the government." Finally, and most important, it
must consist with the "spirit" as well as the letter of the constitution. 32
Currie concludes, "In light of earlier statements in his opinion,
the implication seems unmistakable: incidental authority must not
be so broadly construed as to subvert the basic principle that Con-
gress has limited powers.' 33 In other words, Marshall had come to
sound more like Hamilton, who had admitted that a grant of power
to make necessary laws was not unlimited after all; and also to sound
more like Madison andJefferson than is now usually appreciated.
Perhaps the modern disregard of Marshall's more limited concep-
tion of Congress's implied powers in McCulloch can be explained by
129 For an amusing critique of these categories, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Medium Rare Scru-
tiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT 397 (1998). For a proposed unified standard of review in Equal
Protection cases, see Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2004).
130 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
131 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801-
1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 931 (1982) (quoting John Marshall's opinion in Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 396).
132 Id. at 932 (footnote omitted) (quoting Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)).
133 Id.
Nov. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITU77ONAL LA W
the fact that Marshall made little effort to apply his test to the case
before him. Doing so "would have required a careful examination of
the powers actually granted the Bank, of their relationship to the ex-
plicit powers of Congress, and of the degree to which they under-
mined the principle of limited federal powers.' ' 34 In the end, Currie
agrees that "Marshall devoted most of his effort to demolishing the
straw man of indispensable necessity and slid over the real question
of the propriety of the Bank itself. Moreover, in so doing he seems to
have undermined the exemplary test he had just laid down." This
then became an open invitation for future generations to do the
same.
[Marshall's] cavalier application of the test to the case before him, rein-
forced by his explicit refusal to examine the "degree of... necessity" of
any law "really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the
government," seemed to mean that the limits he had laid down should
not be taken seriously.136
And they have not been.
D. Judicial Deference and the Meaning of "Necessity"
This evidence suggests that, while it is a mistake to equate "neces-
sary" with "convenient," neither was it as stringent a standard as con-
noted by the terms "indispensably" or "absolutely" necessary. Instead,
the original meaning of necessity creates the requirement of a degree
of means-end fit somewhere between these two extremes. Considera-
tions of constitutional construction also argue against a looser stan-
dard of "convenience."
Equating necessity with mere convenience or expediency-the
view commonly, but perhaps mistakenly, attributed to Marshall-
would make the application of this standard a matter of policy prop-
erly left to the discretion of the legislature. On the other hand, if one
adopts the view ofJefferson and Madison that "necessary" means that
a given law must be incidental and closely connected to an enumer-
ated power, then this is a matter of constitutional principle and within
the purview of the Courts to assess. Thus, the true debate is whether
the original meaning of "necessary" was narrow enough to be en-
forced by courts or so open-ended that it instead became completely
within the discretion of the legislature. If the Necessary and Proper
Clause was generally thought justiciable, this further supports the
134 Id. at 933.
135 Id. at 933-34 (footnote omitted).
13 Id. at 934 (alteration in original) (quoting Marshall's opinion in McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 423).
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conclusion that the public meaning of the term "necessary" was not
equated with mere convenience or utility.
There is some textual support for the proposition that this Clause,
like all the other limits on congressional power, should be judicially
enforceable. The first is the fact that the Clause says that laws shall be
necessary and proper. In ordinary life, "shall" sometimes refers
merely to a statement about what someone intends to do in the fu-
ture. In the 1785 edition of A Dictionary of the English Language,'7
Samuel Johnson noted that "[t]he explanation of shall, which for-
eigners and provincials confound with will, is not easy; and the diffi-
culty is increased by the poets, who sometimes give to shall an em-
phatical sense of will." Instead, Johnson repeatedly equated "shall"
with "must." Then as now, in legal discourse the term "shall" was
nearly always a mandatory command. "As used in statutes, contracts,
or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory.",13 When
the law creates discretion, it uses the word "may" instead. Johnson
defined "may" as, "[t]o be at liberty; to be permitted; to be al-
lowed."1
39
The authors of the Constitution were very careful to use "shall"
and "may" properly. This strongly suggests that the injunction, "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper," was not discre-
tionary on the part of the law-making authority to whom it is di-
rected-Congress. It is mandatory, and like all other mandatory pro-
visions, is presumptively enforceable by the other branches of
government, including the courts.
Equally suggestive is the frequency with which the Constitution
specifies the discretion it grants to particular actors indicating that,
when unreviewable discretion was granted over an important matter,
it was done explicitly. Article I, Section 3 stipulates that "[t] he Senate
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." 40 Article I, Section 5
says that "[e] ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members"'4' and that "[e]ach House shall
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy."
42
137 SAMUELJOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,J.F. & C. Rivington
6th ed. 1785). All references toJohnson's dictionary that appear here are to this edition, which
is the closest in time to the drafting of the Constitution. This edition was not paginated so page
numbers cannot be provided.
1'8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
139 JOHNSON, supra note 137.
140 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
141 Id., § 5, cl. I (emphasis added).
1Id.4 I, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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Article I, Section 9 speaks of "[t] he Migration or Importation of such
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit."143
The textual contrast between these provisions and the wording of
the Necessary and Proper Clause severely undermines Joseph Lynch's
thesis that the Clause was so ambiguous that Congress was left "to de-
termine whether, pursuant to that Clause, they could legislate in the
general interests of the country or whether they could merely imple-
ment the specifically enumerated powers."' To the contrary, a bet-
ter presumption is that, where the Constitution grants unlimited dis-
cretion, it does so explicitly.
Although many powers are granted solely to one actor by use of
the phrase, "shall have power," such as the pardon power of the
President, 45 without explicitly saying that the power is unreviewable,
the Necessary and Proper Clause uses "shall" twice: once to say that
"Congress shall have power.., to make all laws" and again to state
that, those laws "shall be necessary and proper.' '146 Only Congress is
granted the power to make laws, but a mandatory standard for law
making is then imposed upon it.
Many examples where discretion is explicitly provided by the Con-
stitution concern the application of a standard, not the allocation of
power. Article II, Section 1 states that "[e]ach State shall appoint
[Electors], in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."'' Arti-
cle II, Section 2 states that "Congress may by Law vest the Appoint-
ment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper." 48 Article II, Sec-
tion 3 specifies that the President "shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to
their Consideration such Measures as he shalljudge necessary and ex-
pedient" and that "he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think
proper.' 49 Article V says that "Congress, whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution."'5°
Congress is given no such discretion over the application of the
standard supplied in the Necessary and Proper Clause. We need not
imagine the outcry that such an expressed discretion would have en-
gendered. Even in its absence, opponents of the Constitution pro-
tested that Congress was being given this discretion while its propo-
145 Id., § 9, cl. I (emphasis added).
144 LYNCH, supra note 26, at 100.
145 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President... shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
146 Id., art. I, § 8.
147 Id., art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
148 Id., § 2, cl. 2(emphasis added).
149 Id., § 3 (emphasis added).
150 Id., art. V (emphasis added).
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nents denied the charge repeatedly-a denial that would have been
impossible in the face of discretionary language comparable to that
found elsewhere in the text. This strongly suggests that, whatever
meaning the Clause had, it must be one that isjusticiable.
Although the justiciability of the Necessary and Proper Clause was
not considered by the Constitutional Convention, where it received
virtually no discussion, the issue did arise in ratification conventions.
In Virginia, when discussing the sweeping clause, George Nicholas
asked rhetorically, "[W]ho is to determine the extent of such pow-
ers?" 5' To this he replied, "I say, the same power which, in all well-
regulated communities, determines the extent of legislative powers.
If they exceed these powers, the judiciary will declare it void, or else
the people will have a right to declare it void.'
5 2
Madison himself raised the issue of justiciability in his second
speech to Congress on the National Bank. To those who asserted
that "necessary" meant merely expedient, he replied, " [W]e are told,
for our comfort, that the Judges will rectify our mistakes. How are
the Judges to determine in the case; are they to be guided in their
decisions by the rules of expediency?'' 1 3 This statement should not
be interpreted as a rejection of judicial review, but as a rejection of a
standard of constitutionality that would preclude judicial review.
Years later in his critique of Marshall's opinion in McCulloch,
Madison argued against an interpretation of "necessary" that takes
the Clause outside the province of the courts, asking rhetorically,
"does not the court also relinquish, by their doctrine, all control on
the legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers?"154 Madison ob-
jected to interpreting "necessary" as merely expedient or convenient,
in part, because doing so would place the matter "beyond the reach
of judicial cognizance."' Ultimately, he questioned, "[B]y what han-
dle could the court take hold of the case?,T
56
Suppose Congress had expressly been given the power to pass "all
laws that it shall think necessary and proper." One indication of how
poorly received such wording would have been is illustrated by an in-
teresting exchange that occurred during the debate over the National
Bank between Representatives Michael Stone of Maryland and Wil-
liam Smith of South Carolina. Stone accused Smith of holding the
view that "all our laws proceeded upon the principle of expediency-
that we were the judges of that expediency-as soon as we gave it as
151 3 DEBATES, supra note 15, at 443.
152 Id.
153 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 2010 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
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our opinion that a thing was expedient, it became constitutional." 57
To this, Smith revealingly replied:
He had never been so absurd as to contend, as the gentleman had stated,
that whatever the Legislature thought expedient, was therefore constitutionaL He
had only argued that, in cases where the question was, whether a law was
necessary and proper to carry a given power into effect, the members of
the Legislature had no other guide but their own judgment, from which
alone they were to determine whether the measure proposed was neces-
sary and proper .... That, nevertheless, it was still within the province of the
Judiciary to annul the law, if it should be by them deemed not to result by
fair construction from the powers vested by the Constitution.'58
Although Smith voted for the Bank Bill, at the same time he re-
jected the "absurd" accusation that Congress was the sole judge of a
measure's necessity and propriety. By insisting on the appropriate-
ness of judicial review, Smith was affirming a conception of necessity
that was narrow enough to bejusticiable. Smith's affirmation ofjudi-
cial review also indicates that the bill's passage need not have repre-
sented an acceptance of the sort of open-ended discretion in Con-
gress that has come to be associated with McCulloch. Instead, a
majority of Congress may well have embraced the stricter meaning of
"necessary" and simply concluded, rightly or wrongly, that the bank's
purpose met this more demanding standard.
That exercises of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
were thought subject to judicial review was also assumed by the au-
thor of the first scholarly work on the Constitution. St. George
Tucker was a professor of law at the College of William and Mary, one
of the leading judges of the General Court in Virginia, and the
American editor of Blackstone's Commentaries, the most influential
and authoritative legal work of the period. In the 1803 edition of the
Commentaries, he attached an appendix discussing the meaning of the
United States Constitution. This work was drawn from the notes of
his lectures given throughout the 1790s, contemporaneous with the
earliest years of the Constitution.
Tucker's account of the Necessary and Proper Clause is nearly
identical to that of Madison's and Jefferson's, as well as to the views
expressed in the ratification conventions. In the appendix to Volume
One of Blackstone's Commentaries, he observed:
The plain import of this clause is, that congress shall have all the in-
cidental or instrumental powers, necessary and proper for carrying into
execution all the express powers; whether they be vested in the govern-
ment of the United States, more collectively, or in the several depart-
ments, or officers thereof. It neither enlarges any power specifically
157 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791).
158 Id. at 1988 (emphasis added).
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granted, nor is it a grant of new powers to congress, but merely a declara-
tion, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into
execution those otherwise granted, are included in the grant.159
Tucker was gravely concerned about the use of the Clause to justify
an unwarranted expansion of congressional power:
But, notwithstanding this remarkable security against misconstruction, a
design has been indicated to expound these phrases in the constitution,
so as to destroy the effect of the particular enumeration of powers, by
which it explains and limits them, which must have fallen under the ob-
servation of those who have attended to the course of public transac-
tions.16°
In a footnote to the preceding statement, he added, "[w]itness, the
act for establishing a bank."
6'
Tucker then offered the following method of construing the
Clause and other powers of Congress:
Whenever, therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality
of a particular power; the first question is, whether the power be ex-
pressed in the constitution? If it be, the question is decided. If it be not
expressed, the next enquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident to
an express power, and necessary to it's [sic] execution. If it be, it may be
exercised by congress. If it be not, congress cannot exercise it ....
He contended:
[T] his construction of the words 'necessary and proper,' is not only conso-
nant with that which prevailed during the discussions and ratifications of
the constitution, but is absolutely necessary to maintain their consistency
with the peculiar character of the government, as possessed of particular
and defined powers, only; not of the general and indefinite powers vested
in ordinary governments.
This construction would constrain members of Congress through
their oaths and is "indispensably necessary to support that principle
of the constitution, which regards the judicial exposition of that in-
strument, as the bulwark provided against undue extension of the
19 St. George Tucker, Appendix, in I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES
OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAws OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 287 (1803).
160 Id.
161 Id. at n.* The footnote continues with further examples: "the act authorising the presi-
dent to appoint officers to volunteer corps of militia; the act declaring that a paper not stamped
agreeably thereto, shall not be admitted as evidence in a state court; the alien and sedition laws,
&c." Id. The note concludes with statements from the report on the committee of the general assembly
of Virginia, on the alien and sedition laws, Jan. 20, 1800: "not to multiply proofs on this subject, it
may be sufficient to refer to the debates of the federal legislature, for several years, in which
arguments have, on different occasions, been drawn with apparent effect from these phrases, in
their indefinite meaning." Id.
162 Id. at 288.
163 Id. (citing report of the committee on the general assembly of Virginia, on the alien and
sedition laws, Jan. 20, 1800, to support his proposition).
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legislative power.' ' 64 Like Madison, Tucker affirmed that this stan-
dard was within the competence of judges to apply. Tucker ex-
plained:
If it be understood that the powers implied in the specified powers, have
an immediate and appropriate relation to them, as means, necessary and
proper for carrying them into execution, questions on the constitutional-
ity of laws passed for this purpose, will be of a nature sufficiently precise
and determinate, for judicial cognizance and control. If on the one
hand congress are not limited in the choice of the means, by any such
appropriate relation of them to the specified powers, but may use all
such as they may deem capable of answering the end, without regard to
the necessity, or propriety of them, all questions relating to means of this
sort must be questions of mere policy, and expediency, and from which the
judicial interposition and control are completely excluded. 65
Although David Currie suggests a more restrictive interpretation
of McCulloch than the decision was given by its critics at the time, it is
the latitudinarian gloss on the meaning of "necessary" that survives to
this day largely unchallenged. While Marshall's fear of impotent gov-
ernment remains a matter of speculation (because he got his way),
history seems to have borne out Madison's expressed concern for the
integrity of the enumerated powers scheme. With rare exception, the
enumeration of powers has largely been vitiated as a limitation on the
scope of the national government, due in no small measure to the in-
fluence ofJustice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch. As Stephen Gard-
baum has observed:
McCulloch is... one of the handful of foundational decisions of the Su-
preme Court that are automatically cited as original sources for the
propositions of constitutional law that they contain. But McCulloch has
the further (and even rarer) distinction of being treated as providing a
full and complete interpretation of a particular clause of the Constitu-
tion. Analysis of the Necessary. and Proper Clause has historically begun
and ended with McCulloch ... 6
Therefore, it is supremely ironic that, like the other leading fig-
ures already discussed, John Marshall also insisted that the courts
should not cede unlimited discretion to Congress. In a practice that
by today's standards would be thought bizarre, Marshall responded to
the torrent of condemnation with a pseudonymously published de-
fense of his own opinion in McCulloch. Writing as "A Friend of the
Constitution," he took pains to emphasize that his interpretation of
the Necessary and Proper Clause did not cede a complete discretion
to Congress:
164 Id.
165 Id. at 288-89 (emphasis added).
166 Gardbaum, supra note 7, at 814.
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In no single instance does the court admit the unlimited power of
congress to adopt any means whatever, and thus to pass the limits pre-
scribed by the constitution. Not only is the discretion claimed for the
legislature in the selection of its means, always limited in terms, to such as
are appropriate, but the court expressly says, "should congress under the
pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of ob-
jects, not entrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty
of this tribunal.., to say that such an act was not the law of the land. 67
True, Madison expressed his doubts about Marshall's assertion of
a continued power ofjudicial nullification:
But suppose Congress should, as would doubtless happen, pass unconsti-
tutional laws, not to accomplish objects not specified in the Constitution,
but the same laws as means expedient, convenient, or conducive to the
accomplishment of objects intrusted to the government; by what handle
could the court take hold of the case?168
Although Madison's gloomy prediction proved prescient, Marshall
had, nevertheless, conceded the point that the judiciary should main-
tain some control over the exercise of congressional power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
III. THE MEANING OF "PROPER": MEANS AND ENDS
Marshall's affirmation that congressional powers are limited to
those means "such as are appropriat"'69 emphasizes a portion of the
Necessary and Proper Clause usually overlooked by those who assert
that it is not justiciable-the meaning of the term "proper." In what
respect could a measure that was shown to be truly necessary to the
effectuation of an enumerated purpose ever be improper? Would a
meaningful means-end scrutiny of the necessity of a restriction on the
people's liberties make an assessment of its propriety superfluous?
One thing that stands out from the records of the Constitutional
Convention is how frequently the term "necessary" was paired with
"proper" (or "unnecessary" with "improper") in contexts suggesting
that each term has a distinct meaning. For example, when Rufus
King of Massachusetts objected to one of the rules of the Convention
"authorising any member to call for the yeas & nays and have them
entered on the minutes," he "urged that as the acts of the Convention
were not to bind the Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this
evidence of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be
167 John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 5, 1819, reprinted in
JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 186-87 (Gerald Gunther ed., Stanford
University Press 1969) [hereinafterJOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE] (emphasis added).
168 Letter from James Madison to judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS, supra note 105,
at 144.
169 Marshall, supra note 167, at 187 (emphasis added).
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frequent in the course of the business & would fill the minutes with
contradictions."
170
Although the distinction between "necessary" and "proper" reso-
nates throughout the convention, it is often hard to figure out its
meaning. Perhaps the clearest example is when Madison objected to
the requirement that, to be a Senator one must have first been a citi-
zen for fourteen years. While he agreed with some citizenship re-
quirement,
[h]e thought any restriction however in the Constitution unnecessary, and
improper. [U] nnecessary; because the [National Legislature] is to have
the right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix differ-
ent periods of residence as conditions of enjoying different privileges of
Citizenship: Improper; because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the
Constitution: because it will put out of the power of the [National] Leg-
islature even by special acts of naturalization to confer the full rank of
Citizens on meritorious strangers & because it will discourage the most
desireable class of people from emigrating to the U.S.
17
1
Madison's use of "unnecessary" here is relatively clear. The end can
be accomplished by other less potentially intrusive means. His use of
"improper" is harder to see, but seems to consist of a kind of wrong
or injustice ("a tincture of illiberality") coupled with the idea that it
was "properly" within the jurisdiction of the legislature to make this
kind of decision. The injustice of such a restriction is underscored by
his comment that, if the Constitution is successful in its aim, "great
numbers of respectable Europeans: men who love liberty and wish to
partake its blessings, will be ready to transfer their fortunes hither.
All such would feel the mortification of being marked with suspicious
incapacitations though they [should] not covet the public honors.",
72
Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger made an extensive examina-
tion of sources from the founding era and concluded that the follow-
ing 'jurisdictional" meaning of proper covers most instances of its ac-
tual use:
In view of the limited character of the national government under the
Constitution, Congress's choice of means to execute federal powers
would be constrained in at least three ways: first, an executory law would
have to conform to the "proper" allocation of authority within the federal
government; second, such a law would have to be within the "proper"
scope of the federal government's limited jurisdiction with respect to the
retained prerogatives of the states; and third, the law would have to be
within the "proper" scope of the federal government's limited jurisdic-
tion with respect to the people's retained rights. In other
170 MADISON, supra note 13, at 25 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 419.
172 Id.
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words, ... executory laws must be consistent with principles of separation
of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights.
1 3
In sum, for a law to be "proper" it must not only be necessary, it
must also be within the jurisdiction of Congress. This propriety of ju-
risdiction is determined in at least three ways: (1) according to prin-
ciples of separation of powers, (2) according to principles of federal-
ism, and (3) according to the background rights retained by the
people. Given the importance of natural rights to constitutional le-
gitimacy in the absence of unanimous consent, 14 let me focus on the
third element: laws are improper when they violate the background
rights retained by the people.
If necessity is taken to mean "convenient," it is easy to see how an
exercise of so discretionary a power could violate the background
rights retained by the people, though taking seriously this problem
reintroduces-under the rubric of "propriety"-many of the difficul-
ties Marshall argued attach to a strict construction of necessity.
Adopting a Madisonian conception of necessity, however, raises a po-
tential difficulty: if a restriction of liberty is shown to be a truly neces-
sary means of executing an enumerated power or end, in what way
can it be considered an "improper" infringement on these back-
ground rights? Have not the people surrendered to the national
government the powers that were enumerated in Article I and any
fight inconsistent with the exercise of such powers?
The answer to this rhetorical question is not as obvious as some
may think. The appropriate legal construct is not the surrender of
rights to a master, but the delegation of powers to an agent. As Mar-
shall himself wrote, "It is the plain dictate of common sense, and the
whole political system is founded on the idea, that the departments of
government are the agents of the nation, and will perform, within
their respective spheres, the duties assigned to them.' 75  When a
principal engages an agent, the agent can be empowered to act on
behalf of and subject to the control of the principal at the same time
the principal retains all of his rights."76 For example, a principal can
empower the agent to sell the principal's car while retaining the right
to sell it himself.
The fact that a principal retains rights is one reason that agents
can be sued for failing to act on their principal's behalf or refusing to
179 Lawson & Granger, supra note 115, at 297.
174 Seegenerally Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003).
175 John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZET-rE, July 15, 1819, reprinted in
JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 167, at 211.
176 See Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law With Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1969, 1981 (1987) ("A principal who authorizes his agent to so act 'on his behalf consensually
empowers the agent to exercise certain rights that the principal alone would normally exer-
cise.").
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conform their actions to their principal's exercise of control. In
normal agency relationships, the empowerment of an agent to act on
the principal's behalf does not make the agent the sole judge of
whether she is acting within the scope of her agency, as the discre-
tionary conception of necessity seems to do. Moreover, the fact that
some rights are inalienable suggests that those who purport to exer-
cise them on behalf of another need to justify their assumption of
such power.1
7
To see how a necessary law could still be improper, consider an
example offered by Madison in his speech explaining his proposed
amendments to the Constitution that became the Bill of Rights.
The General Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be nec-
essary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are
within the direction of the Legislature: may not general warrants be con-
sidered necessary for this purpose... ? If there was reason for restrain-
ing the State Governments from exercising this power, there is like rea-
son for restraining the Federal Government. 1
7 8
In other words, although using general warrants might "be consid-
ered necessary," their use would still be improper and unconstitu-
tional. Nor would it be fair to conclude from this quote that impro-
priety was limited to violations of express restrictions of power.
There is little doubt that the use of general warrants would have been
considered improper during the two-year hiatus between the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution and the amendments. The impropriety of
using general warrants stems from the need to protect a person and
his property from unreasonable searches and seizures. 179
Another example of how the Necessary and Proper Clause con-
fines Congress to using only those necessary means that are also
proper was offered by St. George Tucker: "If, for example, congress
were to pass a law prohibiting any person from bearing arms, as a
means of preventing insurrections, the judicial courts, under the con-
177 See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 179,
185-95 (1986) (defining inalienable rights and providing four reasons why some rights are inal-
ienable).
178 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
179 A "general warrant" was one that did not specify the place or person to be searched and
thus authorized government agents to search whom and where they pleased. Search warrants
immunized a government agent from liability in trespass. The later rise of "sovereign immu-
nity" made warrants less necessary for this purpose, and greatly undermined the incentive of law
enforcement to comply with the warrant requirement. At present, the principal consequence
of a warrantless illegal search is the suppression of evidence, which only helps the guilty. The
original system of immunization from tort liability only when a warrant was obtained also
helped the innocent and provided a greater deterrent against improper searches. See generally
Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Princi-
ples of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937 (1983) (examining the costs of the exclusionary rule and the
benefits of the alternative restitutive model).
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struction of the words necessary and proper, here contended for,
would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the constitutionality of
these means."'Is Giving Congress the power to choose any means it
deems necessary would improperly expand its power to invade the
rights retained by the people-in this case the enumerated right to
keep and bear arms.
But if congress may use any means, which they choose to adopt, the provision
in the constitution which secures to the people the right of bearing arms,
is a mere nullity; and any man imprisoned for bearing arms under such
an act, might be without relief; because in that case, no court could have
any power to pronounce on the necessity or propriety of the means
adopted by congress to carry any specified power into complete effect.'8"
These are examples of improper means thought necessary to ac-
complish an enumerated or "proper" end. Even a necessary means of
pursuing a delegated power can "inappropriately" restrict the exer-
cise of a right retained by the people. According to this view, al-
though it may be necessary and proper to regulate a genuine exercise
of liberty, it is inappropriate to prohibit its exercise altogether.'
Whether or not a restriction on liberty is "inappropriate" would de-
pend, therefore, not only on the degree of means-end fit, but on
whether the measure is a regulation or a prohibition. While wrongful
action can properly be prohibited, it would be improper to prohibit
or deliberately subvert or discourage, as opposed to regulate and fa-
cilitate, rightful conduct.
3
A law would also obviously be improper if enacted to accomplish
an improper end. The powers enumerated in the Constitution, such
as the power to raise and support armies, to establish post offices, or
to grant monopolies for limited periods to authors can be viewed as
objects or ends that are deemed proper by the text. Such powers are
"locked in" along with the other provisions of the written Constitu-
tion as a matter of positive law, whether or not they are truly among
the proper ends of government. 4 In this respect, some ends-scrutiny
is foreclosed by a written Constitution containing enumerated pow-
ers.
ISO Tucker, supra note 159, at 289 (emphasis added).
181 Id. (emphasis added). Notice also that Tucker assumes here that the right of the people
to keep and bear arms is an individual right that would restrict the disarmament of "any man"
without reference to whether he was actively serving in the militia at the time.
182 In contrast, if the action is an exercise of license (as opposed to liberty) it can be prohib-
ited altogether.
183 I discussed the distinction between regulation and prohibition at greater length in Bar-
nett, Original Meaning, supra note 2, in the context of Congress's power to "regulate trade."
184 Laws passed pursuant to an enumerated power that is actually improper, though author-
ized by positive law, may be as illegitimate as the powers created by the Fugitive Slave Clause of
Article IV. Though a judge committed to a written constitution would not be free to declare
such laws unconstitutional, their commands may not bind in conscience.
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Nevertheless, judicial scrutiny of ends would be needed and war-
ranted (or necessary and proper) when Congress purported to be
pursuing an enumerated end, but is actually pursuing a purpose
other than those included in the enumeration of its powers. A law
actually enacted for a purpose or end that was not among those
enumerated would exceed its jurisdiction under the Constitution and
be improper regardless of the means it employed. Such a law would
be, in the words of John Marshall in McCulloch, a mere "pre-
text.., for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the gov-
ernment."185
If Congress were to enact such a law, Marshall insisted, "it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say, that such an act
was not the law of the land. Wholly apart from the need to assess a
measure's necessity, Congress cannot be the sole judge of whether it
is acting within its powers because that would give it license to pursue
objects or ends that are beyond its powers. In other words, an other-
wise necessary law can still be improper if it employs improper means,
such as by prohibiting or discouraging rather than regulating and fa-
cilitating rightful conduct, or if it is intended by Congress to accom-
plish an improper end, such as an end not enumerated in the Consti-
tution.
CONCLUSION
After the Preamble, the very first sentence of the Constitution
reads: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States. ... ,,87 Therefore, evaluating the constitu-
tionality of a federal law must begin by determining whether Con-
gress acted within one of the enumerated powers it is granted in the
Constitution. Identifying the meaning of an enumerated power,
however, is only part of what is required to determine whether Con-
gress is within its constitutionally delegated powers. We must also
reach a conclusion about the meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
The meaning we attach to that Clause not only determines the
scope of congressional power-it determines the degree of deference
that courts owe a congressional judgment that it is acting within its
powers. If you take the view attributed to Marshall that "necessary"
means merely convenient or useful, then courts are generally un-
185 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
186 Id. One way to understand the difference between Marshall and Madison is that, while
Marshall would limit judicial nullification to ends-scrutiny, Madison-and I think Hamilton as
well-would also permit scrutiny of the means chosen in pursuit of a proper end.
187 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). For this reason, if no other, the Tenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution is superfluous.
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qualified to second-guess a congressional determination of expedi-
ency. On the other hand, if the Clause requires (1) a showing of
means-ends fit-as per Madison, Jefferson and even Hamilton-
together with a showing that (2) the means chosen do not prohibit
the rightful exercise of freedom (or violate principles of federalism
or separation of powers) and (3) Congress's claim to be pursuing an
enumerated end is not a pretext for pursuing other ends not dele-
gated to it (as per Marshall in McCulloch), then an inquiry into each
of these issues is clearly within the competence of courts.
The meaning one attributes to the terms "necessary" and "proper" is,
therefore, enormously important because the nature and scope of
judicial review turns on which meaning one adopts. The evidence
presented in this Article should be significant to the many who be-
lieve that the answer to this interpretive question turns in whole, or in
part, on the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
